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Can the United States be a Party
to Binding Arbitration?
The Constitutional Issues
Re-evaluated
Tenaska Washington PartnersH v. The United States'

I. INTRODUCTION
It has long been assumed that the Constitution prohibited the United States
government from entering binding arbitration as a party. The Department of
Justice recently re-examined the issue and concluded that there is no absolute
constitutional bar to government participation in binding arbitration.' Tenaska is
the first reported court decision to adopt the Department of Justice's new
reasoning. The court in Tenaska Washington PartnersII v. The UnitedStates held
that a dispute between a private party and a governmental agency must be
submitted to binding arbitration when the parties' voluntary agreement contains
an arbitration clause.'

H. FACTS AND HOLDING
The underlying dispute between Tenaska Washington Partners II, L.P.
(Partnership) and the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), an agency within
the United States Department of Energy, centers on a contract.4 On April 1,
1994, the parties entered into a Power Purchase Agreement (Agreement).' In that
agreement, the parties agreed that the Partnership would sell all the net electrical
output of its proposed Frederickson Generation Project to BPA for twenty years.6
According to the Agreement's arbitration clause, any dispute that could not be
resolved by the parties' representatives would be settled by arbitration under the
Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association.7

1. 34 Fed. CI. 434 (1995).
2. Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, to John Schmidt, Associate
Attorney General (Sept 7, 1995) (on file with the Dept. of Justice).
3. Tenaska, 34 Fed. CI. at 440.
4. Id. at 436.
5. Id.

6. Id. This agreement ensued from a letter of intent signed by the parties on July 16, 1992,
following a competitive bidding process. Id.
7. Id. at 437. The arbitration clause read as follows:
Pending resolution of a disputed matter, the Parties shall continue performance of their
respective obligations pursuant to this Agreement. Disputes regarding any matter relating
to this Agreement shall be discussed by the Authorized Representatives who shall use
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Following the Agreement, the Partnership arranged financing and contracted
with various other parties for the construction and operation of the project.'
Construction began in 1994. 9
On April 17, 1995, a BPA vice-president notified the Partnership that BPA
did not intend to perform its obligations under the Agreement. 0 BPA took the
position that it was excused from honoring its obligations because supervening
events had frustrated its purpose of agreeing to purchase electricity from the
Partnership." On June 23, 1995, the Partnership brought suit against the BPA
in the United States Court of Federal Claims alleging that BPA had breached the
Agreement.' 2
On August 22, 1995, BPA filed motion to dismiss the
Partnership's claim or in the alternative to stay the court proceeding and to compel
arbitration. "3
In opposition to this motion, 14 the Partnership argued that the Constitution,
particularly the Appointments Clause," prohibits the United States from entering
binding arbitration conducted by an independent arbitrator.' 6 In its brief, BPA
argued that the Department of Justice has now taken the position that the
Constitution does not bar the United States from submitting to binding arbitration
conducted by an independent arbitrator.'7 To support this argument, BPA relied
on a recent memorandum prepared by the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) and
entitled "Constitutional Limitations on Federal Government Participation in
Binding Arbitration" (OLC memo). 8
Recognizing that it was changing its position, the Federal Court of Claims
was persuaded by the reasoning of the OLC memo."' The court held that the
Constitution did not prevent the BPA from entering binding arbitration, granted

their best efforts to amicably and promptly resolve the dispute. Should the Authorized
Representatives be unable to resolve any controversy or claim arising out of or relating
to this Agreement, or the breach thereof, the Parties agree that the controversy or claim
shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the
American Arbitration Association, and judgment upon the award rendered by the
Arbitrator(s) may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof. Id.
8. Id. at 436.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11.

Id.

12. Id. at 436-37.
13. Id. at 437.
14. Id. The Partnership also cross-moved for an order providing that in the event arbitration was
compelled any arbitration award would be binding on both parties and that BPA must continue to
perform its obligations under the Agreement until the dispute was resolved. Id.
15. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
16. Tenaska, 34 Fed. Cl. at 437, 439. The partnership also argued that statutory authority was
lacking and that the arbitration clause was inapplicable to the dispute. Id. at 437.
17. Id. at 437.
18. Memorandum from Walter Dellinger to John Schmidt, supra note 2.
19. Tenaska, 34 Fed. Cl. at 440.
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BPA's motion to stay the court proceedings "pending arbitration," and compelled
the parties into arbitration.2"

III. LEGAL HISTORY
To compel arbitration, BPA had to show that: 1)There was no constitutional
impediment to BPA entering binding arbitration; 2) There was statutory authority
for BPA to enter binding arbitration; and 3) There was a contractual basis for
arbitration. 2' This Note is concerned with the threshold issue of constitutionality.
For 150 years prior to the OLC memo and to this decision, the Department
of Justice took the position that the Constitution prohibited the United States from
submitting to binding arbitration. 2 While the most significant source of concern
was the Appointments Clause; 23 the Take Care Clause24, Non-Delegation
Doctrine, Article III concerns, and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment 5 were also implicated to a lesser degree. 26

A. The Appointments Clause
The Appointments Clause states:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court,
and all other Officers of the United States, whose
Appointments are not herein provided for, and which shall be
established by Law; but the Congress may by Law vest the
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper,
in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads
of Departments.2'
Whether or not the Appointments Clause affects government participation in
turns in part on whether the arbitrator in such a situation is an
binding arbitration
"officer. 28 If the arbitrator is an "officer", he/she must be appointed in

20. Id. at 440, 446. The court expressly made the grant of the motion to stay conditional on
BPA's and the Department of Justice's commitment to uphold binding arbitration inthe case, leaving
the BPA administrator no approval power and only limited judicial review. Id. at 446.
21. Id. at 438.
22. Id.
§ 1, cl.
2.
23. U.S. CONST. art. 11,
24.

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1,cl.1.

25.

U.S. CoNST. amend. V.

26.
27.
28.

Tenaska, 34 Fed. Cl. at 439.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.2.
Memorandum from Walter Dellinger to John Schmidt, supra note 2, at 3.
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accordance with the Appointments Clause.29 Because arbitrators are generally not
appointed in this way,3 °it is necessary to trace the definition of an "officer" as
it has developed in the case law to determine if an arbitrator qualifies as an
"officer" in this situation.
In United States v. Hartwell, the Court established the classic definition of
an "officer" in the constitutional sense." In Hartwell, this Court defined an
"officer" as "a public station or employment conferred by the appointment of
government. The term embraces ideas of tenure, duration, emolument, and
duties."3 2 This definition has been cited and further interpreted in subsequent
Supreme Court decisions. 3
In Hartwell,the court decided that the defendant was an officer subject to the
Appointments Clause.34 When making this decision, the Court noted that he was
in public service; his salary was statutorily fixed; his duties were defined by a
superior, rather than by contract; and his employment was "continuing and
permanent, not occasional or temporary." 35
In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court further defined an "officer" of the United
States as one who exercises "significant authority pursuant to the laws of the
'
The Court found that the Federal Election Commission's
United States."36
investigative and information gathering duties were not the exercise of significant
authority pursuant to the laws of the United States." The Court did, however,
find that the members of the commission were officers since they exercised
significant authority when they enforced compliance with the Federal Election
Campaign Act.38 Because members of the commission were officers, the Court
found that their appointment by Congress without being nominated by the
President violated the Appointments Clause.39
In Freytag v. Commissioner, the Court relied on two factors in determining
that a special trial judge appointed by the Chief Judge of the United States Tax

29.
30.

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976).
Tenaska, 34 Fed. CI. at 439, In the instant case, the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the

at 437. Those rules provide that the
American Arbitration Association were to apply. Id.
Association will compose lists of possible arbitrators from which the parties may strike names with the
Association then making the fmal selection. G. Richard Shell, Arbitrationand CorporateGovernance,
67 N. C. L. REV. 517, 522 (1989).
31. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385, 393 (1868).
32. Id, 73 U.S. at 393.
33. See, e.g., United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 511-12 (1878); Auffinordtv. Hedden, 137
U.S. 310, 327 (1890).
34. Hartwell, 73 U.S. at 393.

35. Id.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126.
Id at 137.
- Id. at 138.
Id. at 126-27.
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Court was an officer.4 ° First, the office of special trial judge, along with its
duties, salary, and appointment procedures was statutory.' Second, the special
trial judge exercised significant discretion in conducting trials. 42 Although
special trial judges did not make final decisions, they did rule on the admissibility
of evidence and enforced compliance with discovery orders.43
In sum, factors that the Court has weighed in determining whether a party or
an individual is an officer subject to the Appointments Clause include: whether
the salary and office were set out in a statute; 44 whether the duties were
continuing or temporary in nature; 4 and whether the party exercised significant
authority and discretion.46
If independent arbitrators conducting binding arbitration with the federal
government as a party fit within the definition of an officer, then clearly the
Appointments Clause applies. If they do not, the question remains: Must the
exercise of significant authority, particularly that which binds the federal
government to an action or payment, be performed by an officer of the United
States? Buckley has been read to stand for the proposition that only officers can
exercise significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States.47 The
court in Tenaska Washington PartnersII v. United States acknowledged that this
position had long been inferred from the Appointments Clause and was one of the
obstacles to the federal government's participation in binding arbitration.4
The Department of Justice took the same position as the U.S. Supreme Court
in Buckley and Tenaska until shortly before the publication of the Office of Legal
Counsel memo ("OLC memo") in September 1995."' The legislative history of
the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act ("ADRA")' 5 is representative of the
effect of the position that only officers can exercise significant authority." The
ADRA was enacted to authorize and encourage the use of alternative dispute

40.

501 U.S. 868, 881-82 (1991). The Court also held that the Tax Court was a "court of law"

within the meaning of the Appointments Clause, and, therefore, had the power to appoint an inferior
officer. Id.at 890-92.
41.

Id.at 881.

42. Id. at 881-82.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
Hartwell, 73 U.S. at 393.
Id.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126.

47. See, e.g., United States v. Miss. Vocational Rehab. for the Blind, 794 F. Supp. 1344, 1354
(S.D. Miss. 1992); Alan B. Morrison, Appointments Clause Problems in the Dispute Resolution
Provisions of the United States-CanadaFree Trade Agreement, 49 WASH. & LEE L REV. 1299, 1302
(1992).
48. Tenaska, 34 Fed. Cl. at 439.
49. Memorandum from Walter Dellinger to John Schmidt, supra note 2, at 16.
50. Pub. L. No. 101-552, § 11, 104 Stat. 2736 (1990). By its terms, the ADRA expired on
October 1, 1995. Tenaska, 34 Fed. Cl. at 438 n.2 (citing Pub. L. No. 101-552, § I1, 104 Stat. 2747).
The proposed re-authorization of the ADRA is discussed infra.
51. Tenaska, 34 Fed. Cl. at 438.
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resolution techniques by federal agencies.52 At subcommittee hearings, the
Department of Justice supported the general thrust of the ADRA and the use of
most alternative dispute resolution techniques, but argued against the use of
binding arbitration based on constitutional concerns.53 Therefore, the bill was
changed to unambiguously place the ultimate decision-making authority with the
agency head, an officer of the United States. 4
UnitedStates v. MississippiVocational Rehabilitationfor the Blind provides
another example of the United States government adopting the position that
because arbitrators exercise significant authority in cases where the federal
government is a party, the arbitrators must be officers appointed in accordance
with the Appointments Clause. 5s Mississippi Vocational involved the RandolphSheppard Act.56 This act sought to facilitate opportunities for the blind by
establishing a program of vending machine and cafeteria operation on federal
property.5" It also provided for arbitration to resolve disputes arising under it.58
In this case, the dispute arose between Mississippi Vocational Rehabilitation
for the Blind (MVRB) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) after NASA denied MVRB's application for a vending permit.5 9 The
Government argued that binding arbitration between a federal agency and a state
licensing agency violated the Appointments Clause.6 ° The Government reasoned
that such arbitrators exercise significant authority as contemplated by Buckley
when they have the power to bind the Government to their decisions." Further,
the Government maintained that only officers subject to the Appointments Clause
can have that type of authority.62 The district court did not disagree with this
reasoning, but held that the arbitrators came within the definition of "inferior
officers;" therefore, their appointment by the Secretary of Education, as head of
the department, satisfied the Appointments Clause.63
Other decisions, however, have accepted the exercise of significant authority
by parties who are not officers of the United States. Auffinordt v. Hedden
involved a merchant appraiser who had the authority to re-appraise imported goods
It is
for the purpose of determining the correct duty to be paid on them.'
especially significant that this appraisal might require the government to reimburse

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
5g.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

S. REP. No. 543, 10 1st Cong., 2nd Sess., at 2 (1990).
Id. at 5.
Id.at 6-7.
Mississippi Vocational Rehab., 794 F. Supp. at 1354.
Id.at 1346.
Id.
Id. at 1347.
Id.at 1348-49.
Id. at 1353.
Id.at 1354.
Id.
Id. at 1354-55.
Auffmordt, 137 U.S. at 312.
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453

the importer for duties paid since the merchant appraiser's decision was final as
far as the importer and the federal government were concerned.6"
Applying the definition in Hartwell, the Court also held that the merchant
appraiser failed to qualify as an officer because the merchant appraiser was
without tenure, duration, continuing emolument, or continuous duties and he acted
only occasionally and temporarily66 The Court held that the merchant appraiser's
duties did include the exercise of significant authority, as he rendered final
decisions in disputes between the government and individuals.67 Even though the
Court held that the merchant appraiser exercised significant authority but was not
an officer, the Court found no violation of the Appointments Clause.6" The
Court ended its discussion of the applicability of the Appointments Clause with
the determination that the merchant appraiser was not an officer, and the Court
made no inference that the Appointments Clause required the merchant appraiser
to be an officer in order to exercise authority under federal law, even when the
government would be bound by the decision.69
The United States Supreme Court in Thomas v. Union CarbideAgricultural
Products Co.7o upheld binding arbitration conducted by independent arbitrators
for resolving conflicts among the parties who registered pesticides pursuant to the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (Act).71 Arguably, these
Their
arbitrators exercised significant authority pursuant to federal law.
determination of rights and compensation under the Act was only subject to
judicial review for fraud, misconduct, or misrepresentation."2 In upholding the
Act's arbitration provision,73 however, the Court did not discuss the
Appointments Clause. Rather, the Court addressed the challenge of the arbitration
provision as a violation of Article III4

Finally, the Federal Court of Claims compelled arbitration of a contract claim
on facts very similar to the instant case. In George J. Grant Constr. Co. v. United
States,7 5 the dispute involved a contract between private parties and a federal
governmental agency.76 Without discussing any constitutional issues, the court
compelled arbitration based on the contract's arbitration clause.77

65. Id.
66. Id. at 327.
67. Id. at 329.
68. Id. at 327.
69. Id. at 327-29.

70. 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 571, 594.
Id. at 592.
Id. at 571.
Id.
109 F. Supp. 245, 245 (Ct. CI. 1953).
Id.
Id. at 247.
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B. Other ConstitutionalIssues
The argument that independent arbitrators should not exercise significant
authority pursuant to federal law has also been made on a non-delegation doctrine
theory.7" This theory provides that there are limits on the authority that the
government may delegate to private actors.79
The Supreme Court in Auffmordt and Thomas upheld the federal
government's delegation of authority to private actors. 80 In those cases, however,
the Court did not discuss the issues in terms of delegation of authority. The
Court's failure to discuss it in those terms implicitly suggests that the nondelegation doctrine in the context of government participation in binding
arbitration is more of a theoretical argument which has not been developed in case
law, than a practical argument. 8 One commentator, however, argues that the
Supreme Court's language in Buckley supports an objection on non-delegation
grounds.82 In Buckley, the court stated that members of the Federal Elections
Commission, not being officers, should not be involved in the administration and
enforcement of the law because that is the province of the executive branch.8"
Another argument contends that Article III of the Constitution may restrict
the federal government from submitting to binding arbitration in some cases.
Article III provides that "the judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested
in one supreme Court, and in 8such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time
4
to time ordain and establish.,
Nearly a century and a half ago, in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land &
Improvement Co.,85 the Supreme Court made it clear that Congress may assign
the resolution of some matters to forums outside of the Article III courts.86 The
Court distinguished between suits at common law, in equity, or in admiralty and
determined that these must remain in Article III courts.87 For other matters, such
as those involving "public rights," Congress can choose to adjudicate in either
Article III courts or another forum.8 8
For some time, the language in Murray's Lessee which identified public
rights as an example of a determination that might be made outside of an Article

78. S. REP. No. 543. 101st Cong., 2nd Sess., at 5 (1990); Memorandum from Walter Dellinger
to John Schmidt, supra note 2, at 13.
79. Memorandum from Walter Dellinger to John Schmidt, supra note 2, at 13.
80. Auffinordt, 137 U.S. at 328; Thomas, 473 U.S. at 571.
81. Jim C. Chen, Appointments With Disaster: The Unconstitutionalityof BinationalArbitral
Review Under the UnitedStates-CanadaFree Trade Agreement, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1455, 1490
(1992).
82. Chen, supra note 79, at 1491 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 139).
83. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 139.
84. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
85. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1855).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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III court was interpreted to mean that all federal adjudications not involving a
public right must take place in an Article III court.89 The Court later explained
that public rights were involved when the dispute was between the government and
citizens about the constitutional functions of the executive or the legislative
branch. 90
The Court's current approach, however, is less dependent on characterizing
Rather, the constitutionality of
a dispute as a private or public matter.9
adjudication in a non-Article II1 forum will be determined in light of the
underlying purposes of Article 111.92 Those purposes entail preserving the
individual's right to have her claim adjudicated by an impartial and independent
tribunal and aiding the maintenance of a checks and balances system.93
In Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, the Court established a
number of factors to consider in deciding whether adjudication outside Article III
courts might undermine the purposes of Article Ill."' First, the Court must look
at whether the "essential attributes of judicial power are reserved to Article Ill
'
In Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., it was
courts."95
sufficient that Article Ill review was preserved for possible arbitrator fraud,
misconduct, or misrepresentation.96 Second, the Court must consider the scope
of the jurisdiction and power assigned to the alternative forum which are
"normally vested only in Article Ill courts."9 7 Where the forum deals with a
"particularized area of law," rather than operating with broad authority, this factor
is unlikely to present a barrier to non-Article Ill adjudication.98 The source and
importance of the rights at stake comprise the third factor.99 For example, the
Court has indicated that Article Ill review of constitutional error should be
Also, the "public rights" distinction
preserved for Article III adjudication."
When Congress vests the adjudication of private
retains some vitality.'
common law rights in an alternative forum, the Court will examine that statutory
scheme carefully because private common law rights have been traditionally
resolved in Article Ill courts.'0 2 Thus, the risk that Congress is invading the role

89.
(1982).

See, e.g., Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. , 458 U.S. 50, 69-70

90.
91.
U.S. 833
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 67-70.
See, e.g., Thomas, 473 U.S. 568 (1985); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478
(1986).
Schor, 478 U.S. at 847.
Id. at 850.
Id. at 851.
Id. (citing Thomas, 473 U.S. at 587, 589-93; Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 84-86).
Thomas, 473 U.S. at 592.
Schor, 478 U.S. at 851.
Id. at 852.

99. Id. at 851.
100. Thomas, 473 U.S. at 592.
101. Schor, 478 U.S. at853-54.
102. Id. at 854.
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of the judicial branch by adjudicating these rights in alternative forums is
greater. 3 The last factor is Congress' interest in providing adjudication outside
The court is unlikely to find Congress' purpose unsuitable
Article III courts.'
where Congress is attempting to provide an expeditious method of determining a
particular type of dispute, and there is no evident attempt to undermine the judicial
branch. 0 5
The above factors are particularly suitable for analyzing statutory schemes
that provide for adjudication outside Article III courts. 0 6 Where, as in the
instant case, the parties voluntarily agree to an arrangement such as binding
arbitration, the Court is still concerned that the arrangement serves the underlying
purposes of Article III.7 Where the parties consent to arbitration, however, the
danger of Congress or the executive branch encroaching on the judicial branch is
minimal. °'
Finally, when determining whether arbitration or another type of hearing
comports with due process, courts consider the factors set out in Matthews v.
Eldridge. 9 These are: 1) the private interest at stake; 2) the "risk of an
erroneous deprivation" of the private interest and the value of additional or
alternate procedures; and 3) the Government's interest in conserving financial and
administrative resources." 0 In Matthews, the Court stated that due process is
flexible and that the procedure may vary with the situation."' Furthermore, in
Schweiker v. McClure, the Court found that vesting decision-making authority in
a private actor may comport with due process. " '

IV. INSTANT DECISION
The court began its discussion of the constitutional issues in Tenaska by
recognizing that the Department of Justice, through Congressional testimony and
internal writings, had always maintained that the United States could not enter into
binding arbitration." 3 The court noted that this was such an established
assumption that there was little precedent on point.'" 4

103.
104.
105.
106.

Id.
Id. at 851.
Thomas, 473 U.S. at 590.
Memorandum from Walter Dellinger to John Schmidt, supra note 2, at 23.

107.

Schor, 478 U.S. at 850-51.

108.

Thomas, 473 U.S. at 591.

109. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
110. Id.
Ill. Id. at 334.
112.
113.
114.

456 U.S. 188, 198-200 (1981).
Tenaska, 34 Fed. CI. at 438-39.
Id. at440.
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In holding that the Constitution does not preclude the federal government
from submitting to binding arbitration, the court relied heavily on the OLC
persuasive
The court found the OLC memo to be a well-researched,
memo.'
6
analysis and adopted its reasoning without much discussion.
Because the OLC memo serves, in effect, as the court's discussion on the
constitutional issue, a brief survey is necessary to explain how the OLC reversed
the Department of Justice's position that the federal government could not enter
binding arbitration.
First, the OLC determined that arbitrators are not officers within the meaning
of the Appointments Clause." 7 The OLC read the cases to define an "officer"
as one who meets the following three conditions: (1) employed with continuing
duties, (2) employed within the federal government, and (3) vested with significant
authority pursuant to the laws of the United States." 8 While acknowledging that
arbitrators fulfill the last condition, the OLC memo stated that arbitrators do not
fulfill the other necessary conditions because they are appointed to resolve a single
matter and because they are private actors rather than employees of the federal
government. "9
The OLC also repudiated the "negative inference" that only officers subject
It
to the Appointments Clause may exercise significant federal authority."
negative
the
to
support
used
had
been
which
of
Buckley
reading
the
broad
rejected
inference for two reasons. 2' First, Buckley cited United States v. Germaine and
Auffmordt with approval.' 22 Significantly, these cases involved private actors
Second, the Buckley language
exercising significant federal authority.' 23
that the individuals were
assumed
authority
concerning the exercise of significant
24
concluded that the
OLC
The
federal employees, not private actors.'
Appointments Clause is simply silent on the exercise of federal authority vested
in private actors.21 5
With respect to the non-delegation doctrine, the OLC found no "pro se
proscription" on the delegation to independent arbitrators of decision-making
authority pursuant to federal law. 126 The OLC noted that the Supreme Court in
Auffmordt and Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes implicitly upheld such

115.

Id.at439-40.

116.

Id. The court noted that the OLC memo is binding on the Department of Justice and other

executive branch agencies, but not on the courts. Id at 440.
117. Memorandum from Walter Dellinger to John Schmidt, supra note 2, at 10.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 13.
121. Id. at 15-16.
122. Id. at 15 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 125-26 n. 162).
123. Germaine, 99 U.S. at 508-09; Auffinordt, 137 U.S. at 312.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 13.
126. Id. at26 (citing Auffinordt, 137 U.S. 310); Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S.
(12 Pet.) 524, 609-13 (1838).
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delegation.127 Thus, the OLC concluded that the non-delegation doctrine
presents no difficulty as long as impartial and discernable standards exist in the
arbitration. 2 '
The OLC, however, recognized that Article III concerns place some
29
For
restrictions on federal government's participation in binding arbitration.'
example, the final adjudication of constitutional rights must remain in Article III
courts. 3 ° The purposes underlying Article I1, however, are unlikely to be
undermined where Congress creates rights by statute or regulatory scheme or
where the government participates in consensual binding arbitration. 3 '
Therefore, Article III is not a complete bar to government participation in binding
arbitration as long as Article III review of constitutional issues and arbitrator
fraud, misconduct, and misrepresentation is reserved.'32
The OLC noted that in some circumstances the Matthews test requires a
' It concluded, however,
binding decision to be made by a government official. 33
that due process generally does not prohibit the determination of claims through
binding arbitration.'34
The court in Tenaska adopted the reasoning of the OLC and concluded that
there is no broad constitutional prohibition on government participation in binding
arbitration as long as there is no statutory prohibition on government participation
and as long as Article III review of constitutional issues and possible fraud,
misconduct, or misrepresentation by arbitrators is preserved.'

V. COMMENT
The decision in Tenaska turned on the reversal of the Department of Justice's
long held stance that there were broad constitutional prohibitions on the federal
government entering binding arbitration as a party.' 36 The constitutional
challenge posed by the Partnership in Tenaska was squarely and thoroughly
addressed by the OLC memo that underlies the new position of the Department
of Justice.' 37 To have rejected the OLC's conclusion would have been to reject
the official position of the Department of Justice. Given the existence of the OLC

127. Id. at 26-27.
128. Id. at 27.
129. Id. at 20.
130. Id.at 23.

at 24-26.
131. Id.
132.
133.
134.
135.
Schmidt,
136.
137.

Id. at 26.
Id.at 27.
Id.
Tenaska, 34 Fed. CI. at 439-40 (citing Memorandum from Walter Dellinger to John
supra note 2, at 26).
Tenaska, 34 Fed. CI. at 440.
Memorandum from Walter Dellinger to John Schmidt, supra note 2, at 1.
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memo with its thorough research, sound reasoning, and prominent contributors13
and given the current federal policy favoring arbitration, 39 the Tenaska court's
holding is an idea whose time has come.
The adjustments to the proposed re-authorization of the Administrative
Dispute Resolution Act (ADRA) demonstrate one immediate consequence of the
change in the Department of Justice's position. 14 The ADRA of 1990 contained
a thirty day "escape" provision for arbitral awards when the government was a
party. 4 ' This permitted the agency head, a United States officer, to retain the
final decision making authority. 42 The provision was a response to the
Department of Justice's concerns about constitutional implications.' 43 In effect,
it meant that arbitration was never binding on the government. On March 27,
1996, the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs recommended a bill
permanently re-authorizing the ADRA without the "escape" provision.'" The
committee, citing the OLC memo, reported that there are no longer any
constitutional objections to government participation in binding arbitration. 4
Under the 1990 Act, private parties simply have not participated in arbitration with
a government agency. 4 6 It appeared that private parties were unwilling to be
bound to arbitration that the other party could unilaterally repudiate. "4v The
Senate Committee suggested that the federal government should have the
flexibility to fully take advantage of the benefits of all forms of alternative dispute
resolution, particularly when a governmental agency functions as a commercial
entity.' 48 The Senate Committee also anticipated accelerating the use of
alternative dispute resolution in contract disputes, employment claims, and
regulatory enforcement more than was seen under the 1991 Act. 49
The constitutional issue, however, was not the end of the inquiry for the
Tenaska court. Having found no constitutional prohibition, it was still necessary

138. Tenaska, 34 Fed. Cl. at 439. The OLC memo was prepared by Assistant Attorney General
Walter Dellinger. See e.g., Walter Dellinger, The Legitimacy of ConstitutionalChange: Rethinking the
Amendment Process, 97 HARv. L. REv. 386 (1983). Several assistant attorneys general contributed.
Memorandum from Walter Dellinger to John Schmidt, supra note 2 (memorandum at I n. 1).
139. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1982).
140. S. REP. No. 245, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996).
141. 5 U.S.C. § 580(b) (1994). The ADRA authorized and promoted the use of a variety of
alternative dispute resolution techniques in federal administrative agencies. S. REP. 543, 10 1st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1990). Enacted in 1990, it expired by its terms on October 1, 1995. 5 U.S.C. § 571 (1994).
137 S. REP. No. 543, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., at 7 (1990).
143. Id. at 5, 7.
144. S. REP. No 245, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., at 6 (1996). As of this writing, Senate bill 1224
has not been voted on.
145. Id.at 5.
t46. 1995 WL 701360 (F.D.C.H.) (testimony of Hon. Marshall J. Breger).
147. Id.
148. S. REP. No. 245, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., at 5 (1996). Saving money, preserving working
relationships, crafting lasting solutions, and conserving judicial resources were among the advantages
noted. Id.at 2, 5.
149. Id.
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to establish statutory authority and a contractual basis for BPA to enter binding
arbitration. 5 ° This analysis by the Tenaska court suggests the form and shape
of the analysis that other courts may undertake in scrutinizing binding arbitration
which involves a federal governmental entity as a party.
The first step is likely to be statutory interpretation. In determining whether
the statutory authority existed for BPA to enter binding arbitration, the court
examined the statute that addressed the administrative authority of the BPA
While the statute did not expressly authorize binding
administrator.'
arbitration, it did empower the administrator to enter and cancel contracts, and to
compromise or settle claims arising under a contract. 52 The court found that
authority to enter arbitration could be inferred from the express power to settle
claims. 5 3 The court also noted that BPA was intended to function as much as
possible like a private business enterprise."4 Because the utilization of
arbitration is now a widely accepted business practice, the statute was interpreted
to give the BPA administrator this power. 5'
Having found no constitutional prohibition and having established statutory
authority, the court next analyzed the contractual basis for compelling
arbitration.' 56 In future cases, as in Tenaska, the analysis of the contractual
arbitration clause will be essentially the same as that used for private parties.
Courts will continue to recognize that arbitration clauses should be construed in
favor of arbitration due to a strong federal policy encouraging arbitration.' 57
The court cautioned that although the arbitration clause provided for
arbitration of all disputes or claims arising out of the contract, the remedies
available were restricted in this situation in a way that would not apply to two
private parties.' For example, the Partnership requested continued performance
of the contract pending resolution of the dispute." 9 The court said that although
this would comport with the agreement, specific performance was not to be had
against the United States where it had not been waived. 60 Because this would
be true in litigation as well, arbitration would not put the Partnership at a
disadvantage as far as remedies were concerned.' 6 '
Private and government parties contemplating arbitration agreements and
policies and Congress in mandating arbitration in statutes must bear in mind that
some restrictions remain even though the Department of Justice has acknowledged

150. Tenaska, 34 Fed. CI. at 438.
151. Id. at 441. The statute in question can be found at 16 U.S.C. §832a(f) (1988).
152.
153.
154.
155.

Tenaska, 34 Fed. CI. at 441.
Id. at 442-43.
Id. at 442.
Id. at 442-43.

156. Id. at 443.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 446 (citing Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24).
Id. at 443-44.
Id. at 443.
Id. at 443-44.
Id. at 444.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1996/iss2/6

14

19961

Catherine: Catherine:Arbitration
Can the United
States Bethe
a Party
to Binding Arbitration
Binding
US.

constitutional prohibition to government participation in
that there is no broad
62
binding arbitration.1
The OLC memo indicates that Article III problems may best be avoided by
limiting the scope of rights determined in the arbitral forum to a particularized
area of the law and by preserving judicial review for constitutional issues and
63
Arbitration is
claims of arbitrator fraud, misconduct, and misrepresentation.'
most clearly appropriate for rights created by statute, regulatory schemes, and
arbitration clauses (as opposed to statutorily
voluntary agreements containing
64
mandated arbitration). 1
The OLC recommendedthat the parties delineate in their voluntary agreement
what remedies are encompassed and that they be certain that there is statutory
authority for those remedies. 65 The OLC also recommended that arbitrators be
clearly impartial and "free from political influence" and that the arbitrators have
66
This would prevent challenges
clear standards to follow in decision-making.
67
grounds.
non-delegation
based on
Finally, it is necessary to remember that, according to the OLC memo, the
Matthews test demonstrates whether due process has been satisfied. 168 The OLC
predicted that results from applying the Matthews test would vary with the
circumstances, but speculated that sometimes a final decision would be required
official rather than a private actor in order to satisfy due
by a government
69
process.

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
319, 335
169.

Memorandum from Walter Dellinger to John Schmidt, supra note 2, at 28.
Id. at 26.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 27.
Id.
Id. (citing Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 198-200; Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
(1976)).
Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Tenaska court stated, "A new era of federal arbitration may be dawning,
the extent of which remains to be seen."' 7 ° What remains to be seen is whether
the ADRA will be re-authorized in its proposed form permitting government
participation in binding arbitration and whether other courts, as the Tenaska court
was, are persuaded by the authority and reasoning of the new Department of
Justice's position accepting federal government participation in binding arbitration.
If so, the private sector is likely to be as confident entering arbitration agreements
with federal governmental entities as they are with other private parties, and the
use of alternative dispute resolution techniques within the federal government will
continue to increase.
CATHERINE CHATMAN

170.

Tenaska, 34 Fed. CI. at 440.
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